## Cryptography via Burnside Groups

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Based on work w/ G.Baumslag, N.Fazio, K.Iga, L.Perret, V.Shpilrain and W.E.Skeith III

#### Goal

Identify viable intractability assumptions from combinatorial group theory

- Evidence of (average-case) hardness (random self-reducibility)
- Cryptographically useful

#### Approach

- Generalize well-established crypto assumptions (LPN/LWE) to a group-theoretic setting
- Study instantiation in suitable non-commutative groups

#### Background

- Burnside Groups (B<sub>n</sub>)
- Learning Burnside Homomorphisms with Noise (B<sub>n</sub>-LHN)

#### 2 Random Self-Reducibility of *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN



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## Outline

#### Background

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#### 2 Random Self-Reducibility of *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN

3 Cryptography (Minicrypt) via Burnside Groups

- Are groups whose elements all have finite order necessarily finite?
- What is their combinatorial structure?

#### B(n, m): "Most generic" group with n generators where the order of all elements divides m

- Generators x<sub>1</sub>,..., x<sub>n</sub> (like indeterminates in a multivariate poly)
- Elements are sequences of x<sub>i</sub> and x<sub>i</sub><sup>-</sup>
- Empty sequence is the identity element of the group
- Exponent condition: For every  $w \in B(n, m)$  it holds that  $w^m = 1$
- Examples:
  - $x_1 x_4^{-1} x_1 \in B(4,3), \quad x_1^{-1} x_4^{-1} \in B(4,3)$
  - $x_1^2 = x_1^{-1}$ , but  $x_1 x_4^{-1} x_1 \neq x_1^{-1} x_4^{-1} = x_1 x_1 x_4^{-1}$  (*B*(4, 3) is not abelian)
  - On the other hand:

$$x_1 x_4^{-1} x_1 = x_4 x_1^{-1} x_4$$
, since  $x_1 x_4^{-1} x_1 x_4^{-1} x_1 x_4^{-1} = (x_1 x_4^{-1})^3 = 1$ 

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• Characterizing *B*(*n*, *m*) not so easy ...

<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> ,2)	Finite and abelian, isomorphic to $(\mathbb{F}_2^n, +)$
<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> , 3)	Finite, non-commutative, much larger than $(\mathbb{F}_3^n, +)$
<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> , 4)	Finite
<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> ,5)	Unknown
<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> ,6)	Finite
<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> ,7)	Unknown
:	:
<i>B</i> ( <i>n</i> , <i>m</i> ), <i>m</i> "large"	Infinite

Will focus on B(n,3) (simplest case beyond vector spaces)
 Notation: B<sub>n</sub> = B(n,3)

- Characterizing *B*(*n*, *m*) not so easy ...
  - B(n,2)Finite and abelian, isomorphic to  $(\mathbb{F}_2^n, +)$ B(n,3)Finite, non-commutative, much larger than  $(\mathbb{F}_3^n, +)$ B(n,4)FiniteB(n,5)UnknownB(n,6)FiniteB(n,7)Unknown $\vdots$  $\vdots$
  - B(n, m), m "large" Infinite
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  - Notation:  $B_n \doteq B(n,3)$

- B<sub>n</sub>: "Most generic" group with n generators where the order of all non-identity elements is 3
  - Generators x<sub>1</sub>,..., x<sub>n</sub>
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  - Exponent condition:  $\forall w \in B_n$ , www = 1 (\*)
- Q: "Most generic"!?

**A**: The only non-trivial identities in  $B_n$  are those implied by  $(\star)$ 

- $\Rightarrow B_n$  non-commutative
  - $x_i x_j \neq x_j x_i$  for any two distinct generators  $(i \neq j)$
- $\Rightarrow$  Group operation in  $B_n$  defined "formally"
  - To "multiply"  $w_1, w_2 \in B_n$ , just concatenate them
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## **Basic Commutators**

- In  $B_n$ ,  $x_i x_j \neq x_j x_i$  for any two distinct generators  $(i \neq j)$
- However, always possible to get  $x_i x_j = x_j x_i [x_i, x_j]$  by defining

$$[x_i, x_j] \doteq x_i^{-1} x_j^{-1} x_i x_j$$

#### Call $[x_i, x_j]$ a **2-commutator**

Similarly, define a 3-commutator [x<sub>i</sub>, x<sub>j</sub>, x<sub>k</sub>] as

$$[x_i, x_j, x_k] \doteq [[x_i, x_j], x_k]$$

• In general, may define  $\ell$ -commutators inductively, but in  $B_n$  all  $\ell$ -commutators vanish for  $\ell \ge 4$ ,

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## **Commutators Identities in** *B<sub>n</sub>*

•  $[x_i, x_j, x_k, x_h] = 1$  implies:

• 3-commutators commute with all  $w \in B_n$ :

$$[\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_j, \mathbf{x}_k] \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{w} [\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_j, \mathbf{x}_k]$$

• 2-commutators commute among themselves:

$$[x_k, x_h][x_i, x_j] = [x_i, x_j][x_k, x_h]$$

• Other commutator identities in *B<sub>n</sub>*:

$$[x_j, x_i] = [x_i, x_j]^{-1} = [x_i, x_j^{-1}] = [x_i^{-1}, x_j]$$
 
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## Normal Form in B<sub>n</sub>

 In general, elements in non-commutative groups may have multiple equivalent forms

• *E.g.*, 
$$x_i x_j^{-1} x_i = x_j x_i^{-1} x_j$$

• In  $B_n$ , commutator identities imply that any  $w \in B_n$  can always be written uniquely as:

$$W = \prod_{i=1}^{n} x_i^{\alpha_i} \prod_{i < j} [x_i, x_j]^{\beta_{i,j}} \prod_{i < j < k} [x_i, x_j, x_k]^{\gamma_{i,j,k}}$$

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
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## Example: The Structure of B<sub>2</sub>



B<sub>2</sub> has 27 elements, of the form

$$x_1^{\alpha_1}x_2^{\alpha_2}[x_1,x_2]^{\beta_{1,2}}, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_{1,2} \in \mathbb{F}_3$$

Isomorphic to Heisenberg Group H<sub>1</sub>(F<sub>3</sub>):

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha_1 & \beta_{1,2} \\ 0 & 1 & \alpha_2 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \in GL(3,\mathbb{F}_3)$$

- Beware of hasty generalization: for  $n \ge 3$ ,  $B_n \ncong H_m(\mathbb{F}_3)$
- No known poly(n)-order representation of B<sub>n</sub>

• Recall the normal form in *B<sub>n</sub>*:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} \mathbf{x}_{i}^{\alpha_{i}} \prod_{i < j} [\mathbf{x}_{i}, \mathbf{x}_{j}]^{\beta_{i,j}} \prod_{i < j < k} [\mathbf{x}_{i}, \mathbf{x}_{j}, \mathbf{x}_{k}]^{\gamma_{i,j,k}}$$

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 ... then reduce back to normal by reordering commutators via O(n<sup>3</sup>) three-stage collecting process (next)

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
$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} \mathbf{x}_{i}^{\alpha_{i}} \prod_{i < j} [\mathbf{x}_{i}, \mathbf{x}_{j}]^{\beta_{i,j}} \prod_{i < j < k} [\mathbf{x}_{i}, \mathbf{x}_{j}, \mathbf{x}_{k}]^{\gamma_{i,j,k}}$$




• To multiply two elements  $w_1$  and  $w_2$ , first concatenate them ...




 ... then reduce back to normal by reordering commutators via O(n<sup>3</sup>) three-stage collecting process (next)



# The Collecting Process (2/3)



# The Collecting Process (3/3)



Fixing each out-of-order generator takes O(n) swaps, and each swap creates a 2-commutator.

Before moving on to the next generator, these O(n) 2-commutators must travel rightward (similarly to step 2 above), which takes  $O(n^2)$  steps

Time:  $O(n^2)$  per generator, total  $O(n^3)$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1[X_2, X_3][X_2, X_3, X_1]X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1[X_2, X_3][X_2, X_3, X_1]X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] =$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1[X_2, X_3][X_2, X_3, X_1]X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1[X_2, X_3][X_2, X_3, X_1]X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$ 

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1[X_2, X_3][X_2, X_3, X_1]X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1X_2[X_2, X_3][X_1, X_2, X_3]^{-1} =$  $x_1^{-1}x_1x_3[x_3, x_1]x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$ 

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1]x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{$$

 $X_1^{-1}X_3[X_2, X_3] \cdot X_1X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $X_1^{-1}X_3X_1[X_2, X_3][X_2, X_3, X_1]X_2[X_1, X_2, X_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1[x_2, x_3]x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$  $x_1^{-1}x_3x_1x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$  $x_1^{-1}x_1x_3[x_3, x_1]x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$  $x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1}x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$  $x_3x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1}[x_1, x_3, x_2]^{-1}[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} =$ 

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1] x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3, x_2]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3] = \\ x_$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1] x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1] x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3, x_2]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_3, x_2][x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1] x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3, x_2]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_3, x_2][x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1] x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3, x_2]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_3, x_2][x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_3, x_2][x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{-1} x_3[x_2, x_3] & \cdot & x_1 x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3, x_1] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3] = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1[x_2, x_3] x_2[x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_3 x_1 x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_1^{-1} x_1 x_3[x_3, x_1] x_2[x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_3, x_2]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_1, x_2, x_3][x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_3 x_2[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_3, x_2][x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3][x_1, x_2, x_3]^{-1} = \\ x_2 x_3[x_3, x_2][x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_2 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3]^{-1} [x_2, x_3] = \\ x_3 x_3[x_1, x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1} [x_3]^{-1}$$

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} X_i^{\alpha_i} \prod_{i < j} [x_i, x_j]^{\beta_{i,j}} \prod_{i < j < k} [x_i, x_j, x_k]^{\gamma_{i,j,k}}$$

#### $\Rightarrow |B_n| = 3^{n+\binom{n}{2}+\binom{n}{3}}$

Efficient (O(n<sup>3</sup>)) group operation

- Cubic in security parameter, but linear in input size
- Similar (somewhat simpler) process to compute inverses (omitted)
- Non-commutative, but enjoys several useful identities
  - www = 1 for any  $w \in B_n$
  - $[x_i, x_j, x_k, x_h] = 1$  for any choice of generators

Q: What computational tasks are hard over Burnside groups?!

$$\prod_{i=1}^n X_i^{\alpha_i} \prod_{i < j} [x_i, x_j]^{\beta_{i,j}} \prod_{i < j < k} [x_i, x_j, x_k]^{\gamma_{i,j,k}}$$

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- Q: What computational tasks are hard over Burnside groups?!

# Learning With Errors (LWE)

#### **The LWE Setting**

- $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$
- $\Psi_n$ : a discrete gaussian distribution over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  centered at 0
- A<sub>s</sub><sup>ψ<sub>n</sub></sup>: distribution on F<sub>q</sub><sup>n</sup> × F<sub>q</sub> whose samples are pairs (a, b) where a <sup>s</sup> ∈ F<sub>q</sub><sup>n</sup>, b = s ⋅ a + e, e <sup>s</sup> ∨<sub>n</sub>

**LWE Assumption** 


$$\mathbf{A}^{\Psi_n}_{\mathbf{s}} \underset{_{\mathrm{PPT}}}{\approx} \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_q^n \times \mathbb{F}_q)$$

Antonio R. Nicolosi Cryptography via Burnside Groups

# LWE over Groups: Learning Homomorphisms w/ Noise

#### **Vector Spaces**

#### Groups



#### Learning With Errors

#### Learning Homomorphisms w/ Noise

secret linear functional  $\mathbf{s} \cdot \_$ Discrete gaussian noise *e*  secret ( $G_n$ ,  $P_n$ )-homomorphism  $\varphi$ "small"  $P_n$ -noise  $e \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \Psi_n$ 

### Learning Homomorphisms with Noise (LHN)

#### **The LHN Setting**


- Groups G<sub>n</sub>, P<sub>n</sub>
- Distributions  $\Gamma_n$ ,  $\Psi_n$ ,  $\Phi_n$  over  $G_n$ ,  $P_n$ , hom $(G_n, P_n)$ , resp.
- A<sup>Ψ<sub>n</sub></sup><sub>φ</sub> (for φ ∈ hom(G<sub>n</sub>, P<sub>n</sub>)): Distribution over G<sub>n</sub> × P<sub>n</sub> whose samples are pairs (a, b) where a <sup>s</sup> Γ<sub>n</sub>, e <sup>s</sup> Ψ<sub>n</sub>, b = φ(a)e

$$\begin{array}{cccc} G_n & \ni & a \\ \varphi \\ & & & \\ P_n & \ni & b & = & \varphi(a)e \end{array}$$

#### LHN Assumption

$$\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\Psi_{n}} \underset{\mathrm{PPT}}{\approx} \mathbf{U}(G_{n} \times P_{n}), \qquad \varphi \overset{s}{\leftarrow} \Phi_{n}$$

## LWE As an Instance of LHN



• 
$$G_n := B_n$$
,  $P_n := B_r$  (*r* small constant, *e.g.*, *r* = 4)

• 
$$\Gamma_n := \mathbf{U}(B_n)$$

• 
$$\Phi_n := \mathbf{U}(\hom(B_n, B_r))$$

• 
$$\Psi_n := \left[ \mathbf{v} \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_3^r), \sigma \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} S_r : \prod_{i=1}^r x_{\sigma(i)}^{v_i} \right] \quad (S_r: r\text{-permutations})$$
  
(dist. over  $B_r$ -elements of Cayley-norm  $\leq r =: \mathcal{B}_r$ )

$$B_n \xrightarrow{\approx \varphi \stackrel{\diamond}{\leftarrow} \hom(B_n, B_r)} B_r$$
$$a \stackrel{\diamond}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(B_n) \longmapsto \varphi(a)e, \quad (e \stackrel{\diamond}{\leftarrow} \Psi_n)$$

 $\mathcal{B}_n extsf{-LHN}$  Assumption $\mathbf{A}^{\mathcal{B}_r}_arphi \cong \mathbf{U}(B_n imes B_r),$ 

.

• 
$$\Gamma_n := \mathbf{U}(B_n)$$

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 (*S<sub>r</sub>*: *r*-permutations)  
(dist. over *B<sub>r</sub>*-elements of Cayley-norm  $\leq r =: \mathcal{B}_r$ )

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 $egin{aligned} B_n extsf{-LHN} extsf{Assumption}\ \mathbf{A}^{\mathcal{B}_r}_arphi & pprox_{ extsf{PPT}} extsf{U}(B_n imes B_r), \end{aligned}$ 

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B<sub>n</sub>-LHN Assumption

$$\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\mathcal{B}_{r}} \underset{\text{PPT}}{\approx} \mathbf{U}(B_{n} \times B_{r}),$$

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#### **B**<sub>n</sub>-LHN Assumption

$$\mathbf{A}^{\mathcal{B}_r}_{\varphi} \underset{\text{PPT}}{\approx} \mathbf{U}(B_n \times B_r), \qquad \varphi \xleftarrow{\hspace{0.5mm}} \mathsf{hom}(B_n, B_r)$$

• 
$$G_n := B_n$$
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# *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN Assumption

$$\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\mathcal{B}_r} \underset{_{\mathrm{ppr}}}{\approx} \mathbf{U}(B_n \times B_r), \qquad \text{any} \quad \varphi \in \mathrm{Epi}(B_n, B_r).$$

#### 1 Background

- Burnside Groups (B<sub>n</sub>)
- Learning Burnside Homomorphisms with Noise (*B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN)

#### 2 Random Self-Reducibility of *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN

3 Cryptography (Minicrypt) via Burnside Groups

### **Random Self-Reducibility (RSR) of** *B<sub>n</sub>***-LHN**

- Worst-case-to-average-case reduction for B<sub>n</sub>-LHN: Solving random instances not easier than solving an arbitrary instance
- Why does random self-reducibility matter?
  - Hallmark of robust crypto assumptions (SIS, LWE, DLog, RSA)
  - Desirable "all-or-nothing" hardness property: Either the problem is easy for (almost) all keys, or it is intractable for (almost) all keys
  - Critical for actual cryptosystems: Generation of cryptographic keys amounts to sampling hard instances of underlying computational problem: by RSR ensures random instance suffices

### Understanding Burnside Homomorphisms

- In  $B_n$ -LHN, secret key is a  $(B_n, B_r)$ -homomorphism  $\varphi$
- $\Rightarrow$  Need to study hom( $B_n, B_r$ )
  - Key fact: All Burnside groups are relatively free
    - For any group *P* of exponent 3, any mapping of generators  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$  into *P* extends uniquely to a  $(B_n, P)$ -homomorphism
    - So  $|hom(B_n, P)| = |P|^n$
    - For  $P = B_r$  ( $r \ll n$ ),  $|\hom(B_n, B_r)| = 3^{\binom{r+\binom{r}{2}}{\binom{r}{3}}n}$

 $\Rightarrow$  The key space in B<sub>n</sub>-LHN is exponential in n (security parameter)

### Abelianization in B<sub>n</sub>

• Abelianization of  $B_n \equiv$  Quotient by its commutator subgroup:

$$[B_n, B_n] \doteq \{\prod_i v_i^{-1} w_i^{-1} v_i w_i : v_i, w_i \in B_n\}$$
$$B_n/[B_n, B_n] \cong (\mathbb{F}_3^n, +)$$

• Abelianization map  $\rho_n : B_n \to B_n/[B_n, B_n] \cong (\mathbb{F}_3^n, +)$ 

$$\rho_n: \prod_{i=1}^n x_i^{\alpha_i} \prod_{i < j} [x_i, x_j]^{\beta_{i,j}} \prod_{i < j < k} [x_i, x_j, x_k]^{\gamma_{i,j,k}} \mapsto (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n)$$

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
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### Abelianizing $B_n$ -LHN *vs.* LWE with p = 3

Q: Does abelianization reduce B<sub>n</sub>-LHN to LWE over 𝔽<sub>3</sub>?

• Recall:  $a \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} U(B_n), e = \prod_{i=1}^r x_{\sigma(i)}^{v_i}$   $(v_1, \dots, v_r) \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} U(\mathbb{F}_3^r), \sigma \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} S_r$ 

# Abelianizing $B_n$ -LHN *vs.* LWE with p = 3

• Q: Does abelianization reduce  $B_n$ -LHN to LWE over  $\mathbb{F}_3$ ?

$$\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\mathcal{B}_{r}} \quad [i.e.,(a,\varphi(a)e)] \approx \mathbf{U}(B_{n} \times B_{r})$$

Recall: a <sup>\$</sup>→ U(B<sub>n</sub>), e = ∏<sup>r</sup><sub>i=1</sub> x<sup>v<sub>i</sub></sup><sub>σ(i)</sub> (v<sub>1</sub>,..., v<sub>r</sub>) <sup>\$→</sup> U(𝔅<sup>r</sup><sub>3</sub>), σ <sup>\$→</sup> S<sub>r</sub>
 Top row represents the B<sub>n</sub>-LHN assumption

# Abelianizing $B_n$ -LHN *vs.* LWE with p = 3

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$$\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\mathcal{B}_{r}} & [i.e.,(a,\varphi(a)e)] & \approx & \mathbf{U}(\mathcal{B}_{n}\times\mathcal{B}_{r}) \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ \rho \\ & & & & \\ & &$$

- Recall:  $a \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(B_n), e = \prod_{i=1}^r x_{\sigma(i)}^{v_i} \qquad (v_1, \dots, v_r) \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_3^r), \ \sigma \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} S_r$
- Top row represents the *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN assumption
- Bottom row shows the result of abelianization

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$$\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\mathcal{B}_{r}} \quad [i.e.,(a,\varphi(a)e)] \approx \mathbf{U}(\mathcal{B}_{n} \times \mathcal{B}_{r})$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \rho \\ \rho \\ \varphi \\ \mathbf{A}_{\overline{\varphi}}^{\mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_{3}')} = \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_{3}'') \times \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_{3}') \equiv \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_{3}'' \times \mathbb{F}_{3}') \end{array}$$

- Recall:  $a \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(B_n), e = \prod_{i=1}^r x_{\sigma(i)}^{v_i} \qquad (v_1, \dots, v_r) \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{U}(\mathbb{F}_3^r), \ \sigma \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} S_r$
- Top row represents the B<sub>n</sub>-LHN assumption
- Bottom row shows the result of abelianization
- Bottom distributions identical—cannot be distinguished!
- $\Rightarrow$  Abelianization does not help recognize  $B_n$ -LHN instances

Two main steps:

**1** Start with a generic partial key-randomization trick

② Show that this randomization is complete in the case of B<sub>n</sub>-LHN with surjective secret key (φ ∈ Epi(B<sub>n</sub>, B<sub>r</sub>))

### Lemma

Let  $\alpha$  be a  $G_n$ -permutation, and  $(a, b) \in G_n \times P_n$  be an LHN-instance sampled according to  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\Psi_n}$  ( $b = \varphi(a)e$  for  $e \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \Psi_n$ ). Let  $a' \doteq \alpha^{-1}(a)$ . Then  $(a', b) \in G_n \times P_n$  is sampled according to  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi_{\alpha}}^{\Psi_n}$ 

#### Proof.

Observe that

$$(a', b) = (a', \varphi(a) \cdot e)$$
$$= (a', \varphi \circ \alpha(\alpha^{-1}(a)) \cdot e)$$
$$= (a', \varphi \circ \alpha(a') \cdot e)$$

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Let  $\alpha$  be a  $G_n$ -permutation, and  $(a, b) \in G_n \times P_n$  be an LHN-instance sampled according to  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi}^{\Psi_n}$  ( $b = \varphi(a)e$  for  $e \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \Psi_n$ ). Let  $a' \doteq \alpha^{-1}(a)$ . Then  $(a', b) \in G_n \times P_n$  is sampled according to  $\mathbf{A}_{\varphi \circ \alpha}^{\Psi_n}$ 

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Observe that

$$(\mathbf{a}', \mathbf{b}) = (\mathbf{a}', \varphi(\mathbf{a}) \cdot \mathbf{e})$$
$$= (\mathbf{a}', \varphi \circ \alpha(\alpha^{-1}(\mathbf{a})) \cdot \mathbf{e})$$
$$= (\mathbf{a}', \varphi \circ \alpha(\mathbf{a}') \cdot \mathbf{e})$$

## **Step 2: Completeness for Surjections**

- Domain Reshuffling provides some partial randomization for an instantiation of the abstract LHN problem
  - For any A<sup>ψn</sup><sub>φ</sub>, can transform an A<sup>ψn</sup><sub>φ</sub>-instance into an A<sup>ψn</sup><sub>φoα</sub>-instance, for any permutation α
- In the case of B<sub>n</sub>-LHN, this simple randomization is complete for the set of surjective homomorphisms:

### Lemma

 $(\forall \varphi, \varphi^* \in \mathsf{Epi}(B_n, B_r))(\exists \alpha \in \mathsf{Aut}(B_n))[\varphi^* = \varphi \circ \alpha]$ 


# **Proving Completeness**

### Claim

Given an arbitrary epimorphism  $\varphi$  and a target epimorphism  $\varphi^*$ , there exist an automorphism  $\alpha$  such that  $\varphi^* = \varphi \circ \alpha$ 

## **Proof Idea**

• Freeness of  $B_n \Rightarrow \exists \beta \in hom(B_n, B_n)$  such that  $\varphi^* = \varphi \circ \beta$ 




- Technical hurdle:  $\beta$  need not be an automorphism!
- Solution: "Patch"  $\beta$  into  $\alpha \in Aut(B_n)$

# **Proving Transitivity**

"Patching argument" (omitted) hinges upon following technical lemma:


### Lemma

Surjections  $\varphi : B_n \to B_r$  are precisely the maps whose abelianization  $\overline{\phi}$  is also surjective



**Proof**  $(\varphi \in \text{Epi}(B_n, B_r) \Longrightarrow \overline{\varphi} \in \text{Epi}(\mathbb{F}_3^n, \mathbb{F}_3^r))$ : Diagram chase

# Proving Transitivity (cont'd)



## **Proof** $(\overline{\varphi} \in \operatorname{Epi}(\mathbb{F}_3^n, \mathbb{F}_3^r) \Longrightarrow \varphi \in \operatorname{Epi}(B_n, B_r))$

- Let  $\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$  be  $B_n$  gener's; define  $y_i = \varphi(x_i)$  and  $t_i = \rho_r(y_i)$
- Thesis amounts to proving {y<sub>1</sub>,..., y<sub>n</sub>} generates B<sub>r</sub>
- By nilpotency of B<sub>r</sub> (cf. next Lemma), suffices to show {t<sub>1</sub>,..., t<sub>n</sub>} generates P<sub>3</sub><sup>r</sup>
- Diagram chase shows  $\rho_r \circ \varphi$  surj.  $\Rightarrow \{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$  generates  $\mathbb{F}_3^r$

# **Proving Transitivity: Generating Sets of** *B<sub>r</sub>*

### Lemma

Let G be a nilpotent group. If  $\{y_1, \ldots, y_m\}$  generates G modulo the commutator subgroup [G, G], then  $\{y_1, \ldots, y_m\}$  generates G.

Since  $B_r$  has nilpotency class 3, and  $B_r/[B_r, B_r] \cong \mathbb{F}_3^r$ , we get:

## Corollary

Let  $\rho_r : B_r \to \mathbb{F}_3^r$  denote abelianization, and  $y_1, \ldots, y_m \in B_r$ . Then  $\{y_1, \ldots, y_m\}$  generates  $B_r$  iff  $\{\rho_r(y_1), \ldots, \rho_r(y_m)\}$  generates  $\mathbb{F}_3^r$ .

## 1 Background

- Burnside Groups (B<sub>n</sub>)
- Learning Burnside Homomorphisms with Noise (*B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN)

## 2 Random Self-Reducibility of *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN

## Cryptography (Minicrypt) via Burnside Groups

# **B**<sub>n</sub>-Based Symmetric-Key Cryptosystem

### Encryption

Fix an element  $\tau \in B_r$  such that the shortest sequence of  $x_i$  and  $x_i^{-1}$  to express it is *"large"* (Cayley norm  $\|\cdot\|_c$ )

 $t \in \{0,1\}$ :  $\mathsf{Enc}_{\varphi}(t) = (a, b\tau^t)$   $a \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} B_n, e \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{B}_r, b = \varphi(a)e$ 

#### Decryption

$$\mathsf{Dec}_{\varphi}(a,b') = egin{cases} 0 & ext{if } \| arphi(a)^{-1}b' \|_{\mathcal{C}} ext{ "small"} \ 1 & ext{o/w} \end{cases}$$

### B<sub>n</sub>-Based Public-Key Cryptosystem?

Challenge: Control noise in products of  $\varphi(a_i)e_i$ 's

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- Algebraic generalization of the LWE problem to an abstract group-theoretic setting
- Exploration of the cryptographic viability of Burnside groups
  - Technical lemmas about homomorphisms between Burnside groups of exponent three
- Evidence to the hardness of the *B<sub>n</sub>*-LHN problem of
  - Random Self-Reducibility: Solving random instances is as hard as solving arbitrary ones

# **Thank You!**