

A Simple Framework for Noise-Free Construction of Fully Homomorphic Encryption from a Special Class of Non-Commutative Groups

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Mathematics of Cryptography @ UCI

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- Proposal of FHE without bootstrapping, based on non-commutative groups (ePrint 2014/097)
 - Homomorphic operators from commutator with rerandomized inputs
 - Constructing underlying groups by group presentations (generators and their relations)
 - “Obfuscating” group structure by random transformations of group presentation
- Candidate choice of groups
 - Attacks for inappropriate groups

- Introduction
- Idea for Homomorphic Operation
- Towards Secure Instantiation

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Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

- PKE + “any computation on encrypted data”
 - “Homomorphic operation” on ciphertexts
- In this talk: Plaintext $m \in \{0, 1\}$, and

$$\text{Dec}(\text{Enc}(m)) = m$$

$$\text{Dec}(\text{NOT}(c)) = \neg \text{Dec}(c)$$

$$\text{Dec}(\text{AND}(c_1, c_2)) = \text{Dec}(c_1) \wedge \text{Dec}(c_2)$$

except negligible error prob.

- Ciphertext for $m \in \{0, 1\}$: $c = pq + 2r + m$
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- Finally yielding dec. failure! (Somewhat HE)
 - Noise reduction required: **“Bootstrapping”** ([Gentry STOC'09])

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- **Goal: FHE without bootstrapping**
 - No (acknowledged) solutions so far

Non-Commutative Groups and Commutator

- We use finite **non-commutative** groups G
 - Multiplicative, with identity element $1 = 1_G$
- **Commutator** defined on G :

$$[g, h] = g \cdot h \cdot g^{-1} \cdot h^{-1}$$

- $[g, h] = 1$ if $gh = hg$
- Always $[g, h] = 1$ if G is commutative

- ① Realize homomorphic operators in group \overline{G}
 - By composing group operators in \overline{G}
- ② “Lift” the structure to large group G
 - With “trapdoor” homomorphism $\varphi: G \rightarrow \overline{G}$
 - Homomorphic operators are “compatible” with φ , hence lifted to G
- ③ “Obfuscate” group structure of G

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- Similar to: $(b = 0 \text{ or } b' = 0)$ implies $b \wedge b' = 0$
 - Starting point of this work

- $\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_1, \bar{c}_2) \in \bar{G} \times \bar{G}$ associated to $m \in \{0, 1\}$:
 - “Class-0” if $\bar{c}_2 = 1$, “Class-1” if $\bar{c}_2 = \bar{c}_1$
 - And $\bar{c}_1 \neq 1$, to distinguish two classes
- Our NOT operator:

$$\bar{c} \mapsto (\bar{c}_1, \bar{c}_1 \cdot (\bar{c}_2)^{-1})$$

- Switching class-0 and class-1

Homomorphic AND Operator?

- Given: Class- m \bar{c} and class- m' \bar{d}
- Our homomorphic AND operator?

$$?? \quad (\bar{c}, \bar{d}) \mapsto \bar{e}, \bar{e}_i = [\bar{c}_i, \bar{d}_i] \quad (i = 1, 2) \quad ??$$

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- \bar{e} is **almost** class- $(m \wedge m')$:
 - $m = 0$ implies $\bar{c}_2 = 1, \bar{e}_2 = 1$ ($0 \wedge m' = 0$)
 - $m' = 0$ implies $\bar{d}_2 = 1, \bar{e}_2 = 1$ ($m \wedge 0 = 0$)
 - $m = m' = 1$ implies $\bar{c}_2 = \bar{c}_1$ and $\bar{d}_2 = \bar{d}_1$, so $\bar{e}_2 = \bar{e}_1$ ($1 \wedge 1 = 1$)

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- But $\bar{e}_1 \neq 1$ **not guaranteed** (e.g., $\bar{c}_1 = \bar{d}_1$)

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- $\overline{e_1}$ will be OK **if \overline{G} is appropriate**

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 - For any $x, y \in \overline{G} \setminus X$,

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- AND keeps $\overline{c}_1 \notin X$ (hence $\overline{c}_1 \neq 1$)
- Examples: $\text{SL}_2(\mathbb{F}_q)$, $\text{PSL}_2(\mathbb{F}_q)$, $1/q$ neg.

- $\Pr[[gxg^{-1}, y] \in X] \leq \frac{|X| \cdot |Z_{\overline{G}}(x)| \cdot |Z_{\overline{G}}(y)|}{|\overline{G}|},$
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- $|\mathrm{SL}_2(\mathbb{F}_q)| = q(q^2 - 1)$
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- Hence commutator-separable, with $X = \{\pm I\}$
 - So is $\mathrm{PSL}_2(\mathbb{F}_q) = \mathrm{SL}_2(\mathbb{F}_q)/\{\pm I\}$, $X = 1$

- Given: $\varphi: G \rightarrow \overline{G}$ (\overline{G} commutator-separable), uniformly random sampling algorithms Sample_G for G and Sample_N for $N = \ker \varphi$
- $\text{pk} = (G, \text{Sample}_G, \text{Sample}_H)$, $\text{sk} = \varphi$
- $\text{Enc}(m) = (c_1, c_1^m \cdot h)$, $c_1 \leftarrow G$, $h \leftarrow N$
- $\text{Dec}(c = (c_1, c_2)) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \varphi(c_2) = \overline{c_2} = 1_{\overline{G}} \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
- $\text{NOT}(c) = (c_1, c_1 \cdot c_2^{-1})$
- $\text{AND}(c, d) = ([gc_1g^{-1}, d_1], [gc_2g^{-1}, d_2])$, $g \leftarrow G$

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- **Assumption** For $1 \neq x \in \overline{G}$, distribution of $F(x) = (g_1 x g_1^{-1})^{\varepsilon_1} \cdots (g_\ell x g_\ell^{-1})^{\varepsilon_\ell}$ for random $g_i \in \overline{G}$, $\varepsilon_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ is statistically close to uniform
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 - \overline{G} is generated by such $g_i x g_i^{-1}$
- Then $\text{AND}(\overline{c}, \overline{d}) = \overline{e}$, $\overline{e}_i = [F(\overline{c}_i), F(\overline{d}_i)]$
(with common randomness for $i = 1, 2$)

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- **Fact** [Dixon '08] For finite group H and sufficiently large L (depending only on $|H|$), for uniformly random $(x_i)_{i=1}^L$ except neg. prob., $\prod_{i=1}^L (x_i \text{ or } 1)$ is statistically close to uniform
- Sample_G and Sample_N are constructed from sufficiently many random elements of G and N

Candidate Strategy for Instantiation

- 1 Choose \overline{G} and N with short group presentations
 - Yielding short presentation for $N \times \overline{G}$
- 2 Define $G = N \times \overline{G}$, with projection $\varphi: G \twoheadrightarrow \overline{G}$

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- ④ (Apply Knuth–Bendix Completion Algorithm to yield efficient group operation in obfuscated G)

- Determines a group (up to isomorphism) by generators and their fundamental relations
- Examples:
 - $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} = \langle x \mid x^n = 1 \rangle$
 - $\mathbb{Z}/15\mathbb{Z} = \langle x, y \mid x^3 = y^5 = [x, y] = 1 \rangle$
 - $S_4 = \langle s_1, s_2, s_3 \mid s_1^2 = s_2^2 = s_3^2 = (s_1 s_2)^3 = (s_2 s_3)^3 = (s_1 s_3)^2 = 1 \rangle$

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- **Fact** [Guralnick et al. '08] $SL_2(\mathbb{F}_q)$ and some finite simple groups have short presentations (length $O(\log q)$ for $SL_2(\mathbb{F}_q)$, q prime)

- Changes presentation, keeping the group unchanged (up to isomorphism)
 - Add an already satisfied relation
 - Remove a redundant relation
 - Add a new generator expressed by old generators
 - Remove a generator which can be expressed by other generators

Example of Tietze Transformation

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- ⑨ $\langle z \mid z^{15} = 1 \rangle$ (This process is reversible)

Necessary Conditions for Groups

- If $g = (g_1, g_2), h = (h_1, h_2) \in G = N \times \overline{G}$,
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 - By birthday paradox, $\sqrt{|N|}$ must be large
- “Equations” in N satisfied with high prob. (but not in \overline{G}) can distinguish $c_2 \in N$ and $c_2 \in G$
 - If N commutative, $xy = yx$ with prob. 1
 - If $N = A_p$ (p prime), $x^p = 1$ with prob. $2/p$
 - Hence these groups cannot be used

- In $\text{SL}_2(\mathbb{F}_q)$ (q prime), $\Pr[\text{ord}(x) = k] \leq \text{neg.}$ unless $k \mid q \pm 1$ and $k \approx q$ or $k = q$
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 - Or N being simple groups of Lie type (or their semidirect products)?
- **Problem:** “Non-artificial” construction?
(without group presentations)

- [Ostrovsky–Skeith III CRYPTO'08]: HE with **non-commutative simple group** as plaintext space implies FHE without bootstrapping
- The strategy based on Tietze transformation would be applicable to realize it as well

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