

Supplementary Algorithms in Supersingular Reductions

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Abstract

We look over some of the algorithms used in [EHL⁺18]. These algorithms appear in [KV12, KLPT14, GPS17].

1 Smoothing Ideals in a Quaternion Algebra

In this section we summarize the main algorithm in [KLPT14].

Let \mathcal{O} be a maximal order in a quaternion algebra B over \mathbb{Q} with prime discriminant p (so \mathbb{Q} ramifies at p and ∞), and let ℓ be a small prime.

Problem 1. Given an left \mathcal{O} -ideal I , find a representative $I\beta$ in it's left ideal class with ℓ -power norm.

We first apply a few reductions to a special case. First write $B = \mathbb{Q}\langle i, j \rangle$ with $i^2 = -q$ and $j^2 = -p$. Here q (which may be 1 or a small prime) is chosen so that B ramifies exactly at p and ∞ . Let R be the ring of integers in $\mathbb{Q}[i] = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-q})$. Then $R + Rj$ is a (possibly non-maximal) order in B .

1. We may assume that \mathcal{O} is p -extremal¹ and contains $R + Rj$.
2. We may assume that I has (possibly large) prime reduced norm N
3. We may assume that N is coprime to ℓ , p , and $|\text{disc}(R)|$.
4. We may assume that I is given by a pair of generators of the form (N, α) .²

Our method for finding β is as follows:

1. Find any random $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}$ with $\text{nrd}(\gamma) = N\ell^{e_0}$.
2. Solve for $[\mu] \in (\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O})^\times$ such that $\mathcal{O}[\gamma][\mu] = [I]$.³

¹This means \mathcal{O} contains a square root of $-p$ and also has trivial two-sided class number. Equivalently, \mathcal{O} is isomorphic to the endomorphism ring of a supersingular curve with j -invariant in \mathbb{F}_p .

²See exercise 16.5 of Voight's book and [GPS17, Sec. 2.1].

³We use $[\mu]$ instead of the usual quotient notation $\bar{\mu}$ to distinguish residue modulo N from conjugation.

3. Lift $[\mu]$ to some $\mu \in \mathcal{O}$ with $\text{nrd}(\mu) = \ell^{e_1}$ (strong approximation).

After these steps, we set $\beta = \overline{\mu\gamma}/N$. It is clear that $\text{nrd}(I\beta) = \text{nrd}(I)\text{nrd}(\beta) = \ell^{e_0+e_1}$. To see that $I\beta \subseteq \mathcal{O}$, notice that $\mathcal{O}[\gamma][\mu] = I \Rightarrow \gamma\mu \in I \Rightarrow \overline{\mu\gamma} \in \overline{I}$.

$$I\beta = I \frac{\overline{\mu\gamma}}{N} \subseteq \frac{\overline{I}}{N} = \mathcal{O}.$$

The last step follows from 16.6.14 of Voight's quaternion book.

1.1 Finding γ

In this section, we focus on finding a random $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}$ with specified reduced norm M .

Recall that $B = \mathbb{Q}\langle i, j \rangle / \{i^2 = -q, j^2 = -p\}$ and our maximal order \mathcal{O} contains $R + Rj$, where R is the ring of integers of $\mathbb{Q}[i] = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-q})$.

It follows from the relation $ij = -ji$ that $j\alpha = \overline{\alpha}j$ for any $\alpha \in \mathbb{Q}[i]$. If $\alpha, \beta \in R$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{nrd}(\alpha + \beta j) &= (\alpha + \beta j) (\overline{\alpha} + \overline{j\beta}) \\ &= (\alpha + \beta j) (\overline{\alpha} - \beta j) \\ &= \alpha\overline{\alpha} - \alpha\beta j + \beta j\overline{\alpha} - \beta j\beta j \\ &= \alpha\overline{\alpha} - \alpha\beta j + \beta\alpha j - \beta\overline{\beta}j^2 \\ &= \text{nrd}(\alpha) + \text{nrd}(\beta)p. \end{aligned}$$

Algorithm 1 Sample integer with given reduced norm

Require: A “nice” maximal order \mathcal{O} , integer M .

Ensure: Element $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}$ with $\text{nrd}(\gamma) = M$.

- 1: **repeat**
 - 2: $\beta \leftarrow$ random element of R .
 - 3: $r \leftarrow M - \text{nrd}(\beta)p$.
 - 4: **until** r splits into principal ideals in R .
 - 5: $\alpha \leftarrow$ generator of a prime in R lying over r .
 - 6: **return** $\gamma = \alpha + \beta j$.
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If R has small discriminant, then the class number will be small so most ideals will be principal. Also, the norm form on R will only include small coefficients. So the run time is determined by how often many β we have to sample. Essentially, we are choosing integers x, y hoping that some quadratic polynomial $f(x, y)$ is prime. If x, y are chosen in a box $[0, m]^2$, then we expect to iterate the inner loop $\log(|M - m^2p|)$ times. The asking for a prime that splits into principal ideals adds a factor determined by the class number of $\mathbb{Q} \otimes R$ (which will be small).

1.2 Finding $[\mu]$

Recall that we are assuming that \mathcal{O} contains R , the ring of integers of $\mathbb{Q}[i] = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-q})$ for a small q . Since N is large, we may assume that N is coprime to $\text{disc}(R)$. Then one can show that $\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O} \cong (R + Rj)/N(R + Rj) \cong M_2(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$. These isomorphisms can be made explicit. Because $I = (\alpha, N)$, it follows that $[I]$ is generated by $[\alpha]$. Let $A_{[\alpha]}$ be the matrix in $M_2(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$ corresponding to $[\alpha]$ under the choice of isomorphism.

We are looking for $[\mu] \in (\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O})^\times$ such that $\mathcal{O}[\gamma][\mu] = [I]$. Since we have γ , and $[I] = [\alpha]$, we are essentially solving a linear equation over $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$: $A_{[\gamma]} \cdot X = A_{[\alpha]}$. The solution can be turned back into an element of $\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O}$.

Remark 2. Note that $A_{[\gamma]}$ and $A_{[\alpha]}$ are rank 1 matrices (because their reduced norm lies in $N\mathcal{O}$).

Algorithm 2 Sample residue class with restriction

Require: A “nice” maximal order \mathcal{O} , $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}$, and left \mathcal{O} -ideal $I = (\alpha, N)$.

Ensure: Element $\mu \in (\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O})^\times$ with $\mathcal{O}[\gamma][\mu] = [I]$.

- 1: $\phi \leftarrow$ explicit isomorphism $\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O} \rightarrow M_2(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$.
 - 2: $A \leftarrow$ solution in $M_2(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$ to $\phi([\gamma])X = \phi([\alpha])$.
 - 3: $[\mu] \leftarrow \phi^{-1}(A)$.
 - 4: **return** $[\mu]$.
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With slightly more care, we can even choose $[\mu]$ in $(R/NR)^\times[j]$.

1.3 Lifting $[\mu]$

Assume now we have $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}$ with reduced norm $N\ell^{e_0}$ and $[\mu] \in (\mathcal{O}/N\mathcal{O})^\times$ with $\mathcal{O}[\gamma][\mu] = [I]$. We further assume that $[\mu] \in (R/NR)^\times[j]$. Our goal is to lift $[\mu]$ to some $\mu \in \mathcal{O}$ with ℓ power reduced norm.

Let $\mu_0 \in R + Rj$ be any lift of $[\mu]$. If ω is a generator for R , then we can write $\mu_0 = x_0 + y_0\omega + (z_0 + w_0\omega)j$. Our goal is to find $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $\mu_1 \in R + Rj$ such that $\mu = \lambda\mu_0 + N\mu_1$ has ℓ -power reduced norm. Write $\mu_1 = x_1 + y_1\omega + (z_1 + w_1\omega)j$.

Recall that we assumed $[\mu] \in (R/NR)^\times[j]$. This means we can choose μ_0 such that $x_0 = y_0 = 0$. Then

$$\text{nrd}(\mu) = N^2 f(x_1, y_1) + pf(\lambda z_0 + Nz_1, \lambda w_0 + Nw_1),$$

where f is the norm form on R with respect to the basis $\{1, \omega\}$. Then

$$\text{nrd}(\mu) \equiv p\lambda^2 f(z_0, w_0) \pmod{N}.$$

Setting this equal to ℓ^e , for an appropriate choice of e , allows us to find λ by taking a squareroot in $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.

Next consider the equation

$$\ell^e - pf(\lambda z_0 + Nz_1, \lambda w_0 + Nw_1) \equiv 0 \pmod{N^2}.$$

This is linear in z_1, w_1 . We choose a random solution such that $|\lambda z_0 + Nz_1|$ and $|\lambda w_0 + Nw_1|$ are less than N^2 . Finally, it remains to find x_1, y_1 such that

$$f(x_1, y_1) = \frac{\ell^e - pf(\lambda z_0 + Nz_1, \lambda w_0 + Nw_1)}{N^2}.$$

Thus, we are looking for $x_1 + y_1\omega \in R$ with a particular norm. This can be done efficiently using standard methods such as Cornaccia's algorithm.

Algorithm 3 Strong Approximation

Require: $[\mu] \in (R/NR)^\times [j]$.

Ensure: A lift $\mu \in \mathcal{O}$ of $[\mu]$ such that $\text{nrd}(\mu) = \ell^e$ for some e .

- 1: $\mu_0 \leftarrow$ an arbitrary lift of μ in Rj of the form $(z_0 + w_0\omega)j$.
 - 2: $\lambda \leftarrow$ solution to $p\lambda^2 f(z_0, w_0) \equiv \ell^e \pmod{N}$ (choose e such that λ exists).
 - 3: $z_1, w_1 \leftarrow$ solution to $\ell^e - pf(\lambda z_0 + Nz_1, \lambda w_0 + Nw_1) \equiv 0 \pmod{N^2}$.
 - 4: $x_1, y_1 \leftarrow$ solution to $f(x_1, y_1) = \frac{\ell^e - pf(\lambda z_0 + Nz_1, \lambda w_0 + Nw_1)}{N^2}$.
 - 5: **return** $\mu = \lambda\mu_0 + N(x_1 + y_1\omega + (w_1 + z_1\omega)j)$
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1.4 Reductions

Earlier we assumed that \mathcal{O} was nice. Here we will show how to solve the problem for a general order.

Suppose we have two maximal orders \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_2 . Assume that we have an algorithm \mathcal{A} which takes a left \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal I and returns β such that $I\beta$ has ℓ -power reduced norm.

Algorithm 4 General orders

Require: Maximal orders \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_2 , a left \mathcal{O}_2 -ideal J , and the algorithm \mathcal{A} .

Ensure: β such that $J\beta$ has ℓ -power reduced norm.

- 1: $I \leftarrow \{\alpha \in B : \alpha\mathcal{O}_2\bar{\alpha} \subseteq [\mathcal{O}_1 : \mathcal{O}_1 \cap \mathcal{O}_2]\mathcal{O}_1\}$, this is a left \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal and right \mathcal{O}_2 -ideal.
 - 2: $\beta_1 \leftarrow$ output of \mathcal{A} applied to I as a left \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal.
 - 3: $\beta_2 \leftarrow$ output of \mathcal{A} applied to IJ as a left \mathcal{O}_1 -ideal.
 - 4: **return** $\beta = \beta_2\bar{\beta}_1\text{nrd}(I)$.
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Next we will verify this algorithm produces the correct output. It is clear that $J\beta$ has ℓ -power norm, so we only check that $J\beta \subseteq \mathcal{O}_2$. It's enough to show that $\bar{\beta}\text{nrd}(J) \in J$ since then $J\beta\text{nrd}(J) \subseteq J\bar{J} = \text{nrd}(J)\mathcal{O}_2$. So to show this, note that

$$\bar{\beta}\text{nrd}(J) = \beta_1\bar{\beta}_2\text{nrd}(I)\text{nrd}(J) = \beta_1\text{nrd}(I)\bar{\beta}_2\text{nrd}(IJ)\frac{1}{\text{nrd}(I)} \in (\bar{I})(IJ)\frac{1}{\text{nrd}(I)} = J$$

Here we are using that if I is a left \mathcal{O} -ideal then $\bar{I}\bar{I} = \text{nrd}(I)\mathcal{O}$, and if I' is a right \mathcal{O} -ideal then $\bar{I}'I' = \text{nrd}(I')\mathcal{O}$

Algorithm 5 Prime reduced norm

Require: A left \mathcal{O} -ideal I **Ensure:** β such that $I\beta$ has prime reduced norm.

- 1: **repeat**
 - 2: $\beta' \leftarrow$ random element of I .
 - 3: **until** $\text{nrd}(\beta')/\text{nrd}(I)$ is prime.
 - 4: **return** $\beta = \overline{\beta'}/\text{nrd}(I)$.
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Another reduction we used was we assumed that I had prime reduced norm. We can do this as follows. It is clear that $I\beta$ will have the appropriate reduced norm. To see that $I\beta$ is an \mathcal{O} -ideal, note that

$$I\beta = I \frac{\overline{\beta'}}{\text{nrd}(I)} \subseteq I\overline{1} \frac{1}{\text{nrd}(I)} = \mathcal{O}.$$

2 ID Protocols and Signature Schemes

In this section we summarize the main results in [GPS17].

2.1 Signature Scheme

In this section, we describe the signature scheme in [GPS17, Sec. 4]. Suppose we have two parties, Sam and Victor. The goal of this protocol is to allow Sam to sign a document and Victor to validate the signature.

Before giving the protocol, we first motivate it by a 0-knowledge proof of an isogeny. Suppose Sam knows an isogeny $\phi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$. In order to prove she knows ϕ , Sam will choose a random isogeny $E_0 \rightarrow E_2$ and publish E_0, E_1, E_2 (but none of the isogenies). Victor can challenge Sam by giving her a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Sam responds by giving an isogeny $E_b \rightarrow E_2$. It would be difficult to for Sam to generate isogenies $E_0 \rightarrow E_2$ and $E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ without already knowing an isogeny $E_0 \rightarrow E_1$.

To make sure that Sam does not reveal any information about ϕ , she needs to choose a “fresh” isogeny $E_b \rightarrow E_2$, i.e. one that does not factor through E_1 . This is done by a clever application of the algorithm in [KLPT14].

The protocol is as follows:

1. (Setup) Sam chooses a random isogeny $\phi : E_0 \rightarrow E_1$ of supersingular curves. She publishes E_0 and E_1 but keeps ϕ hidden.
2. (Sign) To sign an t bit message $m = m_1 \cdots m_t$, Sam does the following. For each m_i , Sam computes a random walk $\phi_i : E_0 \rightarrow E_{2,i}$. Then sets h to be the hash of m and $j(E_1), \dots, j(E_{2,i})$. Let $h_1 \cdots h_s$ be the bits of h . For each i , Sam sets z_i to a “fresh” path from $E_{h_i} \rightarrow E_{2,i}$. The signature is (h, z_1, \dots, z_s) .

3. (Verify) To verify a signature, Victor computes the j -invariant of the end of each path z_i , which is $j(E_{2,i})$. Then Victor computes the hash of the message with these j -invariants and checks it matches h .

It is important that the paths z_i are “random” compositions of low degree isogenies. In particular, paths from E_0 should not go through E_1 and similarly for paths from E_1 should avoid E_0 .

Suppose we have an isogeny or path from E to E' . A “fresh” path can be constructed as follows.

1. Convert the path $E \rightarrow E'$ into a left ideal I of $\mathcal{O} = \text{End}E$.
2. Apply the algorithm of [KLPT14] to find a left equivalent ideal $J = I\beta$ for some $\beta \in \text{End}E \otimes \mathbb{Q}$ such that the reduced norm of J is a power of a small prime.
3. Convert the ideal J into a path $E \rightarrow E'$.

We will describe these steps in more detail below.

The path generated by the algorithm in [KLPT14] only depends on the left equivalence class of the input ideal I . Also, the distribution of outputs is actually quite small. Therefore the output should be considered “independent” of I and a “pseudo-canonical” path from $E \rightarrow E'$.

2.2 Security

The security of this scheme relies on the following problem:

Problem 3. Given two random supersingular elliptic curves E_1, E_2 over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , construct an isogeny $E_1 \rightarrow E_2$.

Theorem 4. *If this problem is hard, then the signature scheme is secure under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.*

2.3 Isogeny Path to Ideal

Note that we may evaluate $\alpha(Q)$ because $\alpha \in \mathcal{O}$ so we may assume it’s given as a linear combination of some known basis for \mathcal{O} for which we have corresponding rational maps in $\text{End}E$.

2.4 Ideal to Isogeny Path

Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve, and let suppose we have an isomorphism from $\text{End}E$ to a maximal order \mathcal{O} in a quaternion algebra. Given an ideal I of ℓ -power reduced norm, we want to compute an isogeny path corresponding to I . The main difficulty is that the isogeny corresponding to I has large degree, so we need to factor it as a sequence of degree ℓ -isogenies.

The point Q can be found by picking a basis $\{P_1, P_2\}$ for $E[\ell^e]$ and computing the matrices A_j for the α_j . Then Q corresponds to a vector in the kernel

Algorithm 6 Isogeny Path to Ideal

Require: A supersingular elliptic curve E , an isomorphism from $\text{End}E$ to a maximal order \mathcal{O} , and a sequence of isogenies $\varphi_i : E_{i-1} \rightarrow E_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, r$ with $E_0 = E$ and $\deg \varphi_i = \ell_i^{e_i}$.

Ensure: A sequence of ideals I_0, \dots, I_r corresponding to the path.

- 1: $I_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_0 = \mathcal{O}$.
 - 2: $n \leftarrow \prod \ell_i^{e_i}$.
 - 3: **for** $i = 1, \dots, r$ **do**
 - 4: $Q \leftarrow$ generator of $\ker \varphi_i$ in $E[\ell_i^{e_i}]$.
 - 5: $\beta_1, \dots, \beta_4 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}$ -basis for I_{i-1} .
 - 6: $f_i(w, x, y, z) \leftarrow n(w\beta_1 + x\beta_2 + y\beta_3 + z\beta_4)$.
 - 7: **repeat**
 - 8: $x_1, \dots, x_4 \leftarrow$ random choice such that $n \sum x_i \beta_i \equiv 0 \pmod{\ell_i^{e_i}}$.
 - 9: $\alpha \leftarrow \sum x_i \beta_i$
 - 10: **until** $\alpha(Q) = 0$
 - 11: $I_i \leftarrow I_{i-1} \ell_i^{e_i} + \mathcal{O}_0 \alpha$
 - 12: **end for**
 - 13: **return** I_1, \dots, I_r .
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Algorithm 7 Ideal to Isogeny Path

Require: A supersingular elliptic curve E , an isomorphism from $\text{End}E$ to a maximal order \mathcal{O} , and a left \mathcal{O} -ideal I .

Ensure: An isogeny path $E \rightarrow E/E[I]$ consisting of low degree isogenies.

- 1: Apply KLPT to replace I with an ideal of powersmooth norm, $\text{nr}(I) = \prod_{i=1}^r \ell_i^{e_i}$.
 - 2: $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_4 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}$ -basis for I as endomorphisms in $\text{End}E$.
 - 3: $E_0, \varphi_0 \leftarrow E, id_E$.
 - 4: **for** $i = 1, \dots, r$ **do**
 - 5: $Q \leftarrow$ any element in $E[\ell_i^{e_i}] \cap \ker \alpha_j$ (see below).
 - 6: $\varphi_i : E_{i-1} \rightarrow E_i \leftarrow$ isogeny on E_{i-1} with kernel $\varphi_{i-1} \circ \dots \circ \varphi_1(Q)$.
 - 7: **end for**
 - 8: **return** $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_r$.
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of the A_j . Note that computing A_j requires solving a DLP (since we need $\alpha_j(P_i) = a_i P_1 + b_i P_2$). This is possible because ℓ^e is small.

References

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